



TransAlta Corporation


Capacity Market Great Expectations

March 2018

TransAlta™ *CLEAN POWER
TODAY AND TOMORROW*



Without a level playing field, subsidized resources will undermine the market



An intermittent system must still be reliable, cost-effective, and competitive

Provincial Policy
Climate Leadership
Plan




Federal Policy
80% below 2005
GHG levels by 2050



**Lower carbon, but
more variable
system**

Maximum Annual NDV Range (MW/day)



Work is still needed on critical design features to meet electricity market objectives

Keep the lights on

Protect consumers from high costs

Ensure fair and equal treatment

Demand Curve Shape

Energy Market Mitigation

UCAP Calculation

Missing pieces of the market design:

Cost of New Entry

Performance Penalties

Capacity Market Mitigation

If generators receive capacity payments, why do they need economic withholding?


Economic withholding is no longer necessary with a capacity market structure.

Past

Present

Future

Economic withholding was required for long-term cost recovery



CMD1 includes economic withholding *and* capacity payments

- Large generators can bid **up to 3 times** their actual dispatch costs
- All other generators can bid **up to the \$999.99/MWh price cap**

Economic withholding *and* capacity payments will **increase costs to consumers**

Up to \$1B/yr

Allowing above-SRMC bidding unnecessarily increases costs to consumers

By allowing *above-SRMC bidding*, CMD1 increases costs by up to \$11/MWh:

Market Scenario	Energy Costs (demand-weighted)	Capacity Costs (levelized)	Total Cost per MWh	Consumer Cost, \$ per MWh	
CMD1 (SRMC Bidding)	\$40.6	\$15.2	\$55.8	\$40.6	\$15.2
CMD1 (Above SRMC Bidding)	\$51.8	\$12.0	\$63.8	\$51.8	\$12.0
CMD1 "Worst Case" for Consumers*	\$51.8	\$15.2	\$67.0	\$51.8	\$15.2

Source: London Economics International LLC, average 2021-2035